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a b s t r a c t
One of the main barriers to the adoption of Personal Health Records (PHR) systems is their closed nature.
It has been argued in the literature that this barrier can be overcome by introducing an open market of
substitutable PHR apps. The requirements introduced by such an open market on the underlying
platform have also been derived. In this paper, we argue that MyPHRMachines, a cloud-based PHR
platform recently developed by the authors, satisﬁes these requirements better than its alternatives. The
MyPHRMachines platform leverages Virtual Machines as ﬂexible and secure execution sandboxes for
health apps. MyPHRMachines does not prevent pushing hospital- or patient-generated data to one of its
instances, nor does it prevent patients from sharing data with their trusted caregivers. External software
developers have minimal barriers to contribute innovative apps to the platform, since apps are only
required to avoid pushing patient data outside a MyPHRMachines cloud. We demonstrate the potential
of MyPHRMachines by presenting two externally contributed apps. Both apps provide functionality
going beyond the state-of-the-art in their application domain, while they did not require any speciﬁc
MyPHRMachines platform extension.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Without the participation of the patient, a health care provider
cannot effectively treat (or prevent) disease-causing behaviors.
The doctor–patient relationship is therefore gradually evolving
from a paternalistic approach to a more participatory model [1,2].
Houston and Ehrenberger argue that a key factor for successful
patient participation is information sharing: patients require good
information not only to care for themselves, but also to effectively
communicate with their physicians [3]. Empowering the patient
with information is particularly important since information
exchange between different caregivers is very limited [4], espe-
cially beyond the scope of local business networks (such as the
Partners HealthCare system in the US state of Massachusetts or the
The Eye Care Network in the Netherlands [5,6]).
The two key stakeholders in this scenario, i.e., patients and
their physicians, are often willing and capable to share information.
Already before the turn of the millennium, for instance, various
online surveys demonstrated high adoption rates of e-mail as
a patient-provider communication medium [7]. E-mail information
sharing, unfortunately, has several limitations. Most notably, mes-
sage exchanges are completely ad hoc, preventing patients to build
and maintain a longitudinal record of their health data, to use the
integrated record to effectively care for themselves, and to share all
their health data effectively and securely with their caregivers.
To overcome these limitations, Personal Health Record (PHR)
systems have been proposed by various companies and authors in
academia [8]. PHR have many societal beneﬁts, such as empower-
ing patients in the management of their own health and fostering
interoperability among health care providers, possibly reducing
the overall costs of diagnosis and treatment [9]. Policy makers,
therefore, have repeatedly called for technologies that “enable
patients, doctors and other health care providers to access perso-
nal health records securely through the Internet, no matter where
a patient is seeking medical care” [10,11]. Unfortunately, PHR
adoption levels in practice are very low due to privacy concerns
as well as the lack of convincing medical and business use cases.
The US department of Health and Human Services, for instance,
has invested heavily with the expectation that “once the market
has structure, patients, providers, medical professionals and ven-
dors will innovate, create efﬁciencies and improve care” [10].
One of the reasons for the low level of adoption of PHRs is their
lack of openness at the platform level. Mandl and Kohane [12]
have addressed the issue by looking at positive and negative
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experiences from various health record projects. The authors con-
clude that PHR technologies should go beyond the “conventional”
requirements for Electronic Health Record (EHR) technologies, i.e.,
interoperability, security, and privacy. PHR systems should support
open innovation and, therefore, they should (a) reduce impediments
to the transfer of data, (b) provide substitutable software compo-
nents, i.e. “apps”, and (c) they should allow competition and
“natural selection” for high-value, low-cost software components.
Regarding substitutability, the authors clarify that PHRs should
enable the combination of software components developed by
different vendors without creating impediments to replace such
components over time [12].
In this paper, we propose the use of MyPHRMachines, a PHR
platform that satisﬁes the above requirements. The platform is
unique in its openness: it presents the least possible impediments
to the transfer of data and it prevents apps from violating privacy
requirements by design. These properties are based on the use of
Virtual Machines (VMs) as ﬂexible and secure execution sandboxes
for the apps. To show the effectiveness of the approach, we discuss
externally contributed apps for Radiation Exposure Measure
(REM). As we will show later, radiology and, more speciﬁcally,
REM, is a typical application scenario that can beneﬁt from an
open PHR platform.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
discusses the shortcomings of current PHR platforms with regards
to openness. Section 3 describes the MyPHRMachines platform.
Section 4 gives the motivation for and presents the REM applica-
tion scenario, while Section 5 describes the REM apps in MyPHR-
Machines. Finally, Section 6 discusses the contribution of the paper
by providing a link also to the PHR literature.
2. Openness of PHR platforms
Opening a platform enables its owners to strategically disclose
aspects related to the development or commercialization of the
platform [13].
There are broadly two different approaches to opening a plat-
form. The ﬁrst entails giving up some control over the platform,
whereas the second entails only granting access to the platform to
outsiders [14]. When a company devolves all control over a platform,
there is no longer a single party who controls its evolution. In terms
of PHR platforms, this would mean for example that the develop-
ment activities for a platform are opened up to the open source
community, or to selected commercial software vendors. The Indivo
platform is the primary example of this form of PHR platform
openness [15]: starting from a development project at the Harvard
Medical School and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
project was then opened to the open source community as well
as to Google, Microsoft and other commercial partners.
The second form of openness (granting access) implies that the
platform owner maintains control over its core development while
relying on the market to provide complementary innovation
around it. Apple's App store is a well known example of this
approach, where the company not only preserves control over the
platform's development, but even controls the transactions on the
platform. Microsoft HealthVault is a well known PHR platform that
is open to apps from third party developers, while Microsoft
controls the core platform [16].
We position the novelty of our PHR platform in the latter
category. MyPHRMachines provides app developers with open
access to the app platform, but it guarantees that patients can
trust the platform in the protection of their personal data.
As illustrated in the remainder, other PHR platforms are either
(1) completely closed or (2) pose too tight restrictions on the type
of data that can be managed by the platform. In the latter case,
technical guarantees regarding the prevention of data abuse are
completely missing. Therefore, for those PHR platforms that grant
app developers access to deploy their apps, access is only granted
to trusted parties that can be held liable in case they violate their
promises to the platform provider and end users. MyPHRMachines
makes such app-speciﬁc trust considerations irrelevant, since
technical privacy protection measures are already implemented
at the platform level. Consequently, a MyPHRMachines-based
App store can be opened up securely also to non-trusted app
developers.
PHR system architectures can be classiﬁed into provider-tethered
and free-standing ones [17]. For the provider-tethered variant, the
PHR system is essentially a portal extension of Hospital Information
Systems (HISs), which only contain data from one health care
provider or institution. Examples in this category are EPIC MyChart
[18] and MyHealtheVet [19], tethered from the EPIC EHR and the
HIS of the US Department of Veterans Affairs, respectively. Free
standing PHRs are stand-alone PHR platforms, which can store data
generated and provided by various health care institutions or by the
patient. Examples in this category are HealthVault and Indivo
version X [15]. In principle, this classiﬁcation only considers the
stakeholder controlling the PHR platform (a single health organiza-
tion versus an independent party). In practice, all tethered PHR
systems are completely closed, while some free-standing PHR
systems make their platform accessible to external app builders.
Still, there are fundamental issues even for free-standing solutions.
Below, we discuss some of these issues for the cases of Microsoft
HealthVault and Indivo X.
Microsoft HealthVault provides a set of libraries (e.g. for Java
and .NET developers) to Create, Read, Update, and Delete (CRUD)
all types of data in the HealthVault system. The libraries are based
on a Web service API. Similarly, Indivo X enables external software
to perform CRUD operations on its health data through XML-based
standard data models. Indivo X is also integrated with SMART [20],
a more general solution to support the exchange of health data
among health institutions. SMART provides an OWL-DL ontology
to semantically annotate health data. Unfortunately, for both
platforms, two of the requirements elicited in Section 1 are not
satisﬁed:
1. existing platforms do not actively prevent apps from violating
end-user privacy requirements, and
2. existing platforms poseimpediments on the transfer of health
data.
The ﬁrst issue relates to Mandl et al.'s conventional requirements
for EHR systems, while the second one relates to their extra
requirements for openness.
The privacy issue is caused by the fact that neither HealthVault
nor Indivo X apps are executed inside a controlled ecosystem.
Instead, app code is executed on a third party infrastructure and, if
users grant an app access to load PHR data, then that data can
travel freely to the servers of the app providers. In terms of
liability, the platform providers (Microsoft and others) push
responsibilities to the app builders and the end-users. This implies
that (i) all app builders need to provide terms of use agreement
that promises that patient data will not be abused and (ii) end-
users need to review and consent such agreements for each and
every app. While such agreements can protect end-users ex-post
(e.g., legally) they do not physically prevent app providers to
maliciously use the PHR data behind the scenes. Also, for app
builders not interested in patient data, this need for app-speciﬁc
data use agreements forms an undesirable barrier to entering the
app market.
The second issue, i.e., impediments on the transfer of health
data, is caused by the fact that data can only be stored on the
P. Van Gorp et al. / Computers in Biology and Medicine 51 (2014) 14–23 15
HealthVault or Indivo X servers if it strictly conforms to the data
formats that have been selected by the platform providers. This is
a fundamental limitation since it prevents a market-based evolu-
tion of such formats. As a practical example of the impediment, we
observed that it is impossible to store radiology images in the
Indivo X platform and in the European deployment of HealthVault.
A practical negative consequence of this is that, for example, in the
case of HealthVault, many third party apps store data outside the
platform's data repository. This is in conﬂict with the substitut-
ability of the PHR apps requirement, since only the apps from
speciﬁc third parties will be able to access the radiology data.
Although over time platforms such as Indivo X and HealthVault
may address such limitations, we argue that fundamentally, there
will always be medically meaningful data for which a competitive
app market moves ahead of platform-imposed standard data
formats.
In the remainder, we explain how MyPHRMachines overcomes
these issues.
3. MyPHRMachines as an open and trustable PHR App
platform
In this paper we focus on the aspects of MyPHRMachines that
make it an open platform. Other details about MyPHRMachines
can be found in the previous work of the authors [21–23].
MyPHRMachines is a cloud-based PHR system. It gives patients
convenient access to remotely running virtual machines (VMs),
which give access to all their PHR data. We informally deﬁne apps
as light-weight applications that provide very focused function-
ality (as opposed to monolythic information systems). In this
context, VMs are the MyPHRMachines-speciﬁc “app” technology.
VMs run as a service on a trusted and powerful hardware
infrastructure and fulﬁll the role of app containers. MyPHRMa-
chines apps can be accessed from regular computers and from
tablets or mobile phones.
Section 3.1 summarizes the technical architecture of MyPHR-
Machines, while Section 3.2 discusses speciﬁcally the privacy
protection as a service enabled by the design of MyPHRMachines.
An example app, i.e. a radiology image viewer, is presented in
Section 3.3. While that example app has been contributed by the
MyPHRMachines platform developers, the two apps from Section
5 are provided by third parties. Section 3.4 brieﬂy explains the
process of deploying new apps to MyPHRMachines.
3.1. Technical architecture
MyPHRMachines has a layered architecture and reuses various
robust components such as a commercially available hypervisor
and an open source data cloud with interfaces to commercial data
clouds. The platform is extremely ﬂexible with regards to PHR data
formats and middleware and it makes apps available as a service
via thin client technologies.
Fig. 1 shows the architecture of MyPHRMachines. At the highest
aggregation level, MyPHRMachines comprises a client and a server
layer. The server layer is further decomposed into an execution
layer and a storage layer.
MyPHRMachines relies on thin clients: a client should be able
to (1) access the app store, (2) run a viewer to work with remote
VMs and (3) up- and download PHR data via the data cloud
components. The three arrows leaving the Browser component in
Fig. 1 show that any device with HTML and Java support already
satisﬁes the above three requirements, without any MyPHRMachines-
speciﬁc software installation. The Native RDP Client represents native
client software required to support function (2) by non-Java enabled
clients, e.g. clients running iOS, which does not support Java at the
time of writing. MyPHRMachines, in fact, relies on the standard
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)to view remote VM sessions. The
Native Own Client and Dropbox clients support function (3). For its data
cloud functionality, MyPHRMachines relies upon off-the-shelf soft-
ware from the mature OwnCloud project [24]. Besides providing
secure storage within the MyPHRMachines infrastructure, the Own-
Cloud component also enables users to plug in their DropBox or
Google Drive for mounting less sensitive data [25] (see the link
connecting elements of Dropbox to the Private Data Cloud).
In the storage layer, Fig. 1 shows also the Private Network Folders.
While the private data cloud requires an ad hoc virtual network to
the OwnCloud server that runs within the MyPHRMachines infra-
structure, these mounted folders are accessible even to VMs that do
not have a network interface. Although the OwnCloud server is
residing in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ [26]), protected by a ﬁrewall, it
is not as secure as the mounted folders mechanism since, in theory,
an app could hack its way from the ad hoc network to the OwnCloud
server and then to the public internet. This is impossible for VMs
without a network interface.
The execution layer of the MyPHRMachines server contains two
components: the Web Portal (or AppStore) and the Hypervisor. The
web portal manages the access control of users to apps. This can be
therefore seen as the “app store” of MyPHRMachines. The app store
Fig. 1. Layers in the architecture: apps run as a service on trusted infrastructure.
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also communicates with the Hypervisor, which is a generic piece of
software to start, stop, and clone VMs and control their Internet
access. MyPHRMachines currently uses VirtualBox, i.e. an off-the-
shelf hypervisor, which is heavily used also in other industries, e.g.,
banking. Finally, messages between the app store and the hypervisor
are delivered via SSH, a secure and stable communication protocol.
Patients can communicate with their health providers in two
ways: ﬁrst, they can delegate the remote access to a VM and,
secondly, they can share the raw PHR data using the underlying
data cloud. This private data cloud provides ﬁle sharing features
similar to DropBox and Google Drive, but it also ensures that the
physical location of the data is by default within the trusted
MyPHRMachines infrastructure. This feature was added to
MyPHRMachines recently (i.e., after the publication of our pre-
vious work [21–23]). It relates in general to removing impedi-
ments to the transfer of data between trusted parties (cf., the
criteria from Section 1). In particular, it enables patients to grant
their GP a copy of speciﬁc PHR ﬁles for the sake of accountability.
Also, thanks to the OwnCloud sync client, patients can conveni-
ently upload new PHR content (e.g., a copy of a new radiology CD).
Open innovation is supported by MyPHRMachines by the fact
that any health care institution or software provider can contri-
bute a new app by remotely cloning an existing VM image,
installing the new software remotely, and publishing it to the
app store. App developers can choose between accessing health
data ﬁles directly from the VM ﬁle system or accessing data
through a more heavy-weight Application Programmer Interface
(API). The platform is ﬂexible because any kind of middleware that
runs on an operating system that can be virtualized can also be
used to build apps.
VM sessions in MyPHRMachines are stateless, meaning that
data that is written to the local disk of a VM will be deleted after
VM shutdown. This enables app developers to update their VMs
without worrying about migrating patient-speciﬁc VM sessions.
MyPHRMachines does enable apps to create or update data
persistently in a patient's PHR. This is realized by means of
a writable mounted folder in the patient's VMs. Additionally, data
can be persisted via the private data cloud.
3.2. Privacy protection as a platform service
MyPHRMachines protects privacy as a platform service. Although
privacy is seen as essential in the context of the requirements
discussed in Section 1, no other platform provides technical
mechanisms for this. This subsection clariﬁes that, in contrast to
the novelty of having this service, its implementation is relatively
simple to realize, given the architecture described in the previous
subsection.
MyPHRMachines can provide a privacy protection service
thanks to its very design, which is based on the principle that
software should be moved to data rather than vice versa. Once all
software is available in the MyPHRMachines private cloud, apps no
longer need access to external Internet services. The MyPHRMa-
chines execution layer therefore enforces that published VMs have
no network interface with Internet access. Even if a malicious app
developer, for example, installs malware in a VM, such malware
will fail to push data outside of the app container.
PHR platforms lacking the ability to completely block Internet
access by apps have to rely on complex analyses of the data
streaming out of their ecosystem (e.g., has the patient approved
access to the data by the app builder? Is the app builder's server
properly authenticated? Is trafﬁc properly encrypted? Can the data
pass over servers that are subject to the US patriot act? etc.).
Note that MyPHRMachines does not guarantee privacy protec-
tion in general. In particular, since MyPHRMachines aims to reduce
impediments to the transfer of data, patients can choose to use the
OwnCloud component in combination with a US-based cloud
storage provider (e.g., DropBox), and therefore be subject, for
instance, to the NSA scrutiny. Yet, MyPHRMachines does guarantee
that PHR data is protected from app builders (and their govern-
ments). This implies that when a MyPHRMachines cloud is
deployed on EU infrastructure, the NSA could not force US-based
app builders to give access to PHR data on which their apps are
applied. This example implication is of high political relevance in
current times.1
3.3. Example app: radiology image viewer
Radiology tests are often repeated due to the loss of a test result
or due to inconvenient provider access to the images. Besides
being inconvenient and unhealthy for patients, this also represents
a waste of insurance and taxpayers money. In order to avoid this
waste, insurance companies can simply provide their patients free
use of a specialized Microsoft Windows app (VM) in MyPHRMa-
chines [21]. As illustrated below, that is sufﬁcient for giving any
specialist convenient online access to a patient's radiology images.
Ge et al. recently presented a novel portal prototype to store
and share radiology images under patient ownership [27]. The
MyPHRMachines radiology image viewer app presented here
provides the same functionality as that prototype with a simpler
implementation of an app that is substitutable. The implementa-
tion of the app is simpler since it reuses viewer software that is
already embedded in the patient's radiology CD. Moreover, the
functionality to give a physician access to the viewer is imple-
mented at the MyPHRMachines platform layer. The app is sub-
stitutable since anyone can install a more advanced viewer to
a new VM and offer that to other MyPHRMachines users.
Fig. 2 shows tablet and laptop access to the image viewer app in
MyPHRMachines. As explained in Section 3.1, the laptop provides
zero-install access to the specialized app (since the app viewer
relies on HTML and Java only). The tablet is an iPad (for which Java
support is not available). Hence, it relies on a native RDP client for
working with the remote VM. Multiple such RDP clients are
available regardless of MyPHRMachines and our radiology viewer
app. Therefore, also at this level, MyPHRMachines supports sub-
stitutability. From the usability point of view, the use of a native
RDP client does require users to enter the address and port on
which the remote VM is running. Android tablets (which do
support Java) do not have this potential usability barrier.
Fig. 2. MyPHRMachines demo app: basic radiology image viewer in a specialized
VM.
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
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The delegation of access to radiology images does not require
any app-speciﬁc implementation since it is supported by a generic
MyPHRMachines platform feature, i.e. the app store portal (see
Fig. 1). That portal enables patients to delegate access to any of
their active VMs. More speciﬁcally, for every active VM, patients
can generate an automatic e-mail message which enables the
recipient to log in to the remote VM without signing up for a
MyPHRMachines account [21].
Readers are encouraged to visit the companion Web site
https://sites.google.com/site/myphrmachines/ for hands-on access
to this demo. The demo provides anonymous access to a dummy
account for which multiple radiology CDs have been uploaded to
the PHR.
3.4. Contributing a new app to MyPHRMachines
The companion Web site of this paper will be maintained to
provide up-to-date instructions for contributing new apps. In this
paper, we abstract from the rather volatile user interface details
and focus on the conceptual workﬂow for deploying new apps to
MyPHRMachines. Technical details have been published before
[22,23], so we omit them here.
Fig. 3 sketches the key activities related to new app provision-
ing. The diagram uses BPMN, an industrial standard notation for
modeling business processes [28]. The upper swimlane shows
tasks that are executed by representatives of an external software
vendor while the lower one displays tasks that are executed by
employees of an organization offering the MyPHRMachines plat-
form services. The current deployment of MyPHRMachines is
maintained for academic demonstration purposes only. However,
anybody can contact the authors for leveraging that demonstrator
infrastructure.
The workﬂow model shows at its top left an empty circle with
thin edge, representing the process start event. The ﬁrst task in the
process (i.e., “Request VM Clone”) is executed by the app builder. As
explained in Section 3.1, the web portal enables such app builders
to request a clone of an existing virtual machine. The two external
apps presented in Sections 5.2 and 5 are based on clones of
Windows and Linux virtual machines respectively.
MyPHRMachines VMs are organized in groups. This is important
since otherwise all apps would be visible in one global namespace,
which would not scale. Each group has at least one administrator.
The “Group Admin” lane in Fig. 3 models the tasks that should be
executed by such administrators, in the context of the new app
deployment workﬂow. The dashed arcs between different lanes
represent messages that are sent by the MyPHRMachines portal.
The workﬂow can only proceed from one task A to a successor task
B if (1) A is completed and (2) for each incoming message ﬂow in B,
a message has been received. Following this semantics, Fig. 3
sketches that the app builder can only deploy his binaries to the
cloned VM after the clone request was approved by an adminis-
trator, and after that administrator has moved the cloned VM to
a private group. The purpose of such group is to contain virtual
machines that are not yet ready to be published in the app store.
Fig. 3 includes three tasks that are labeled “Test VM”. The tasks
are in the lanes of the app builder, an alpha tester and a beta tester.
All testers use exactly the same software, i.e., exactly the same VM
conﬁguration, but their VM instances will be initialized with their
own individual test data. Each tester can upload test data using the
same functionality that end-users use to upload PHR data. If either
the alpha tester or app builder think the VM is not ready yet for
a release to the app store, the workﬂow moves back to task
“Deploy Binaries”. Upon each entry of that task, the app builder
gets private and mutable access to the VM conﬁguration. When
completing the task, the VM conﬁguration is saved such that each
tester and subsequent user will start from the same software
conﬁguration context.
When the app builder decides to publish a VM, a group
administrator moves it to a public group. Finally, the VM is made
available in the app store. Optionally, a quality check can be ﬁrst
performed by platform maintenance staff. While the workﬂow in
Fig. 3 focuses on the general case, MyPHRMachines manages also
the access rights and stakeholder notiﬁcations for the various tasks.
4. Radiation exposure monitoring
This section introduces our application scenario of Radiation
Exposure Monitoring (REM). We ﬁrst discuss the need for REM in
Section 4.1 and then provide more technical details about the
measurement of radiation exposure in Section 4.2.
4.1. The need for patient-level rem services
X-rays have been ofﬁcially classiﬁed as a carcinogen by research
agencies and prevention centers [29,30]. The presumption is that
signiﬁcant increase in the population's cumulative exposure to
ionizing radiation will cause an increased incidence of cancer years
down the line. To prevent this, it is not advisable to take a passive
data collection and prevention approach, since “radiation-induced
cancers typically do not occur until 1 or 2 decades or longer after
exposure.” [31] The largest epidemiologic study currently available
Fig. 3. Workﬂow for contributing a new app to MyPHRMachines.
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shows a statistically signiﬁcant increase in cancer at radiation dose
estimates in excess of 50 mSv [32]. Many computed tomographic
(CT) scans and nuclear medicine studies have effective dose
estimates whose cumulative doses easily exceed this level [31].
Related knowledge is gradually expanding, among others via
international cohort studies [33]. In the meanwhile, “the current
annual collective dose estimate from medical exposure in the
United States has been calculated as roughly equivalent to the total
worldwide collective dose generated by the nuclear catastrophe at
Chernobyl” [31,34,35].
REM aims at monitoring the level of exposure to ionizing
radiation by patients. Over the last decades, signiﬁcant progress
has been achieved by monitoring mean exposure values against
so-called Diagnostic Reference Levels (DRLs). Rehani for example
shows that initially some countries had very disturbing high
exposures whereas results were more harmonized after alerting
these issues and acting upon them [36]. This is all however at the
national policy level and the exposures for individual patients are
not yet properly governed. The current absence of patient-level
monitoring mechanisms means that individual patients that
receive dangerously high exposures will remain un-noticed by
today's radiology information systems. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this problem has not received much research attention yet,
but one can easily conceive high cancer risk scenarios.
From a healthcare informatics point of view, it is indeed
challenging that patients are likely to undergo scans at different
health care institutions during their life. In contrast, organizing
REM support around the patient is very natural since patients can
track exactly the number and type of scans they have undergone.
We argue that patients should therefore be empowered with PHR-
based REM application software, enabling them to monitor their
radiation exposure over time and discuss it with their caregivers.
This patient empowerment enables doctors to make better risk
assessments and specialize the diagnosis and treatment plan.
Large radiology technology vendors are aware of the afore-
mentioned issues. However, Brosky has recently clariﬁed on
a professional radiologist community website why it is unrealistic
that they will provide integrated REM services soon [37]. The
author describes the results of a European vendor-focused inte-
gration workshop. Although various vendors are offering standard-
compliant dose reporting products, these products are deemed to
fail on today's market. On one hand, there is a vast installation base
of legacy products that (1) do not support the standard reporting
interfaces and (2) are not expected to be phased out. Moreover,
even when a standard-compliant reporting system is used, health-
care administrators still need to conﬁgure (or program) the data
transfers between local and centralized REM systems. At such
integrationworkshop, only one of the eight participating companies
provided “a full-scale dose information reporter that enables
a healthcare system to look into the accumulated data and extract
actionable information.” [37]. Other vendors indicated that “If we
build it now, no one will buy it”.
4.2. Calculating the cumulative estimated dose of radiology
absorption
There is a key difference between the radiation exposure from
the various imaging modalities and the actual amount of radiation
absorbed by a patient. The latter is dependent on the amount and
properties of each tissue encountered by the X-ray beam. As it is not
practical to insert radiation detectors into each organ of every
patient, absorbed radiation dose is measured only directly in
extreme cases of oncology treatment. Therefore, there is a great
need to support the accurate estimation of absorbed radiation doses.
Promising results have been achieved in the area of automatic
CED calculation. More speciﬁcally, recent software programs enable
the automatic extraction and analysis of dose-related parameters
from image meta-data. So far, these programs have only been used
within complex pipelines. For example, Jahnen et al. [38] use such an
extraction component within the PerMoS chain, which is primarily
designed to monitor DRL conformance at the governmental level.
Aware, inc, provides a chain that also relies on a central dose index
registry. The Aware chain does include components at ﬁner granu-
larity levels: it provides support for monitoring the conformance of
individual technician and physicians and also aims at risk manage-
ment for individual patients [39]. However, for monitoring patient-
level exposures, the Aware chain assumes that all hospitals visited by
the patient push their data to the central registry. As clariﬁed by
Brosky [37], this is unfortunately not realistic.
At the core of the aforementioned chains are, however, extrac-
tion and analysis components that would provide patient-level
CED calculations when provided with patient-level data. In this
paper, we use MyPHRMachines to provide patient-level data
securely to the extraction and analysis components of PerMoS
(Tudor) and Aware.
5. REM apps in MyPHRMachines
We have deployed the two alternative CED management
components of the Tudor and Aware chains apps in MyPHRMa-
chines. Both apps visualize received dose values in a patient-
centered manner. In the following, we ﬁrst discuss the input
format requirement of both apps. We then discuss the key
functionalities of the individual apps. Finally, we reason about
the implications of having these two demonstrators.
5.1. App input: DICOM
The DICOM standard deﬁnes aﬁle format for storing radiology
data on physical media (e.g., CD ROMs) as well as a communication
protocol for transferring images from/to remote servers.
File format: DICOM prescribes a standard format for storing
radiology images. Additionally, the standard prescribes
how to store information aboutthe image data. Such
information is called “metadata”. Besides standardizing
metadata for characterizing the patient (e.g., name), the
standard also prescribes metadata ﬁelds for storing
technical equipment and machine parameters (e.g., scan-
ner model, scan length, scan modality and scan location).
When using full digital equipment, dose information is
stored explicitly in DICOM ﬁelds too. For older equip-
ment types however, such information is missing and
therefore the aforementioned simulation methods need
to be employed. The ﬁrst app (MyPHRDoseReporter)
supports full digital equipment as well as legacy equip-
ment while the second app only supports full digital
equipment.
Communication protocol: The second app includes a VM startup
script that automatically collects all the user's radiology
data and sends that via standard DICOM protocol mes-
sages to the Aware REM server that is running locally in
the remote VM.
From an end-user's perspective, the second aspect is an imple-
mentation detail. What does matter for end-users is that both apps
require input data stored in the DICOM ﬁle format.
5.2. Tudor app: MyPHRDoseReporter
MyPHRDoseReporter is an application supporting the visuali-
zation and management of medical images. The application
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integrates various open source libraries developed by the Public
Research Centre “Henri Tudor” into a patient-centered app. The
app supports both the construction of a personal radiology record
as well as the inspection thereof. Regarding record building, the
app can import data from (virtualized) patient CDs. The app can
harmonize input data in order to overcome differences in the
implementation of the DICOM standard by different scanner
manufacturers. Regarding inspection, the app supports both the
interactive viewing of radiology images as well as the calculation
of estimated dose values for various modalities and machine
brands. Fig. 4 shows a screenshot with cumulative dose results
grouped by imaging modality.
The app can manage input from various radiology imaging
modalities, as illustrated in Table 1. Based on an inspection of all
images in a patient record, the app generates a tabular overview of
the received dose. The Computed Tomography (CT) modality involves
rotating beams, while the others involve unidirectional beams. The
Computed Tomography Dose Index volumetric (CTDIvol) value is used
as a dose descriptor per CT volume. One CT scan consists of multiple
such volumes and each volume can differ in beam intensity. The
Dose Length Product (DLP) is used to quantify the complete dose for
a CT scan. In CT, doses are taken directly from the DICOM
metatadata (if available) or from a Monte Carlo simulation-based
application otherwise (i.e., CT Expo [40]). For Diagnostic Radiology
(DR), Fluoroscopy (DF) and Angiography (XA), MyPHRDoseReporter
computes the Dose Area Product (DAP), which describes the dose
quantity per square centimeter. For Mammography (MG), MyPHR-
DoseReporter extracts the Mean Glandular Dose (MGD), i.e. the
mean dose to the glandular tissue of the scanned breast. As most
MG machines are full digital, no Monte Carlo based simulation
methods are implemented for this modality.
All metrics from Table 1 are well known to radiology specialists.
Moreover, since specialists tend to use their own reference values
for these metrics, depending on hospital protocols and national
guidelines, MyPHRDoseReporter simply presents the raw metric
results and leaves the interpretation of the data to the app user. In
the long term, the following issues need to be tackled:
1. understanding which dosimetry concepts are of relevance to
patients,
2. understanding which dosimetry concepts are useful for radi-
ology nurses,
3. understanding how the degree of uncertainty can be properly
presented.
These issues are the subject of ongoing research at Tudor. The app
functionality can be extended by (i) including appropriate refer-
ence values in the output report, (ii) aggregating Effective Dose
values, (iii) comparing the received individual dose to easy under-
standable facts, (iv) adding support for additional modalities, such
as Nuclear Medicine activities, and (v) taking into account the
current age of the patient.
Fig. 4. Tudor's DoseReporter app in MyPHRMachines.
Table 1
Dose ﬁgures for the different modalities in MyPHRDoseReporter.
Modality DICOM identiﬁcation Dose ﬁgure Meaning of dose ﬁgure Extracted (X) or calculated via simulation (S)
Computed tomography CT CTDIvol Computed tomography dose index, volumetric X if available, S otherwise
DLP Dose length product X if available, S otherwise
Digital radiology DR DAP Dose area product X
Fluroscopy DF DAP Dose area product X
Angiography XA DAP Dose area product X
Mammography MR MGD Mean grandular dose X
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5.3. Aware app: MyAccuradREMServer
The Aware Accurad REM Server is a software suite that has
been designed for empowering radiologists with REM support. The
server is typically connected to all radiology equipment of
a hospital and possibly to the servers of other hospitals. One
server typically contains the data of all patients that are known to
the hospital. The MyAccuradREMServer app is a patient-centered
VM deployment of such a server. The patient can access all
calculated dose ﬁgures or delegate access to a specialist.
In contrast to MyPHRDoseReporter, MyAccuradREMServer does
not provide simulation-based estimations based on the DICOM
data from legacy scanners. However, it provides a more convenient
user interface. Besides providing convenient table and graph
ﬁltering widgets, the Aware app provides workﬂows for deﬁning
and monitoring radiology protocols.
Fig. 5 shows the app's visualization of various cumulative dose
results for a dummy patient. The ﬁgure shows that the cumulative
dose can be displayed per target region (head versus lumbar spine,
in the example).
5.4. Evaluation
From an evaluation perspective, we stress that (i) both apps have
been developed and deployed by stakeholders external to the
MyPHRMachines project and (ii) the two apps do not require any
extension to the MyPHRMachines platform to function. This illus-
trates that the platform is indeed open to external functionality.
We also stress that the platform is unaware of the format of the data
consumed by the apps (i.e., DICOM content). This is in contrast to the
requirements that other app-oriented PHR platforms (e.g., Health-
Vault and Indivo X) impose on input and output data formats. Beyond
the PHR context, both apps demonstrate that an open, patient-
oriented approach to Health Informatics may empower caregivers
with functionality that may not available in HISs. Using the example
apps discussed in this paper, patients can indeed present cumulative
dose reports to their radiologist. Such reports cannot usually be
generated by the HIS used by the specialist. Even hospitals equipped
with a state-of-the-art REM server typically are still lacking integra-
tion with servers of other hospitals (cf., Section 4.2).
6. Discussion
This section discusses how this paper relates to the PHR
literature. In particular, Section 6.1 discusses the advantages and
potential pitfalls of using VMs as a more general PHR platform
technology. Section 6.2 focuses on literature about PHR adoption
barriers and facilitators. We include that section to clarify how we
have leveraged adoption studies from other PHR systems in the
design of MyPHRMachines.
6.1. Strengths and potential pitfalls of using virtual machines as apps
This section discusses the key strengths of the VM-based
architecture as well as pitfalls that should be avoided by app
Fig. 5. Aware's MyAccuradREMServer app in MyPHRMachines.
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developers. The key strengths of the architecture are its ﬂexibility
and trustability. The ﬂexibility strength is illustrated by the DICOM
viewer example: zero-programming effort was required to deploy
an off-the-shelf DICOM viewer into MyPHRMachines. This ﬂex-
ibility is in strong contrast to the PHR architectures with restrictive
APIs (such as Indivo X [15]), which would require a signiﬁcantly
higher effort to build and maintain the apps described in this
paper. The trustability strength follows from the aforementioned
platform feature, which makes it impossible for apps to send
patient data to external servers.
The ﬂexibility strength, however, comes with a pitfall. Since the
MyPHRMachines platform does not impose the use of standard
data formats, a naive use of the platform would result in patient
records riddled with syntactically or semantically incompatible
fragments. App developers aware of this pitfall, however, may turn
it into an enabler, by deploying apps to translate health record
fragments into a proprietary format (or in the format of a
deprecated standard) or into the latest standard format. Again,
we argue that the ability to obtain such functionality from the App
market makes the architecture more scalable than architectures
where only the platform owners can provide data conversion
functionality. Note that the fact that MyPHRMachines does not
impose any data standards does not prevent the use of standards.
In this paper, for example, we leverage DICOM as a standard for
storing radiology data.
Another pitfall along a similar direction is that MyPHRMachines
app developers may re-build low-level functionality, rather than
reuse middleware features provided by platforms with heavyweight
APIs. We argue that app developers should install inside their VM
any meaningful middleware they can afford. For example, devel-
opers of diabetes-speciﬁc apps may want to deploy SMART mid-
dleware to their virtual machine [20]. This would provide themwith
libraries to manage lab data coded using the Logical Observation
Identiﬁers Names and Codes (LOINC) standard.
The MyPHRMachines trustability strength also comes at a cost.
By blocking general Internet access for patient-instantiated VMs,
apps cannot by default leverage public Web services. This is
unavoidable if one aims at fully dependable, platform-provided
privacy governance of patient data. The example apps described in
this paper do not require such services. For the sake of general-
izability, we brieﬂy discuss here how MyPHRMachines supports
the use of public Web services in apps.
MyPHRMachines enables providers of stateless Web services to
deploy their service in long-running VMs inside the MyPHRMa-
chines cloud. Such VMs can be made available securely to patient-
speciﬁc VMs. This is the same design choice we adopted for the
OwnCloud service discussed in Section 3.1, which also runs in a
long-running VM. In some practical cases, providers of very
popular Web services could refuse to offer their service in this
way. If the providers of such services are considered trustworthy,
then VMs can be given controlled Internet access to a speciﬁc
domain. Careless use of this platform feature is however a pitfall
that may decrease the trustability of MyPHRMachines apps.
6.2. MyPHRMachines and PHR adoption barriers
In relation to the issues described in Section 2, McGraw
acknowledges that today's PHR systems too often impose consent
contracts that jeopardize patient privacy [41]. Kahn et al. also
highlight that providers of PHR software services are not necessa-
rily subject to US privacy laws and therefore are not as trustworthy
as conventional care providers [42]. Another study by Witry et al.
also reveals concerns about the consent contracts imposed by
today's health record systems [43].
MyPHRMachines provides privacy at the platform level, making
“app”-speciﬁc privacy contracts irrelevant. According to McGraw,
that should bolster trust in such systems and promote their
adoption [41]. Patel's survey [44] investigates the types of privacy
threats patients are really concerned about. In that study, 94% of
the surveyed patients had no privacy concerns towards their
physicians [44], while respondents did have signiﬁcant privacy
concerns towards insurers, employers and the (US) government.
To the best of our knowledge, no scientiﬁc studies have been
conducted to analyze whether Patel's results are valid beyond the
US context. Therefore, it remains unclear which company or
organization provides the right trust level for providing the
MyPHRMachines platform professionally at a European or global
scale. However, if within a speciﬁc context one trusted party offers
the MyPHRMachines platform, then all the untrusted parties will
be able to effectively deploy apps to that ecosystem. In particular, if
patients do not trust the app providers, the MyPHRMachines
platform guarantees that apps will notsend data to the untrusted
parties.
Kahn et al. conclude that the key technical adoption barrier for
PHRs is that patients have to provide a large amount of informa-
tion manually, using tedious and error-prone Web forms [42].
Other studies report that doctors are concerned about patients
being too poorly informed to understand the meaning of their PHR
data [45,46]. Family physicians interviewed by Witry et al. there-
fore viewed potential in PHRs as a backup source of medical
information secondary to the patient's medical record as opposed
to a tool for patient self-care [43]. Also, a physician from that study
expressed that “For quality and efﬁciency it is worth it” and “It is
worth it to give it to people for free. You'd save the (US) government
money.” In the context of this paper, we envision that in the long
term, data could be pushed automatically to the PHR once
produced in a hospital (or once a copy arrives at a patient's GP).
In our radiology use case, we currently expect patients to upload
the content of a radiology CD. Patients have a good incentive to
upload the data, as they do not have to worry anymore about
preserving the physical CD. The MyPHRMachines platform also
provides technical interfaces (beyond the scope of Section 3.1)
enabling hospitals to send the radiology data directly, saving them
the time and costs of creating CDs and sending them to patient
homes.
Another study concludes that family physicians are quite open
to sharing information with patients, as long as the related
information systems are easy to use and as long as their value to
the practice of medicine has been demonstrated [46]. Regarding
usability, we have also taken into account study results by Witry
et al. [43]. The authors conclude that physicians are concerned
about the time it takes to log into a PHR system and lookup
speciﬁc information. We have taken this concern into account by
enabling patients to (1) collect speciﬁc information as preparation
for a time-critical doctor meeting and (2) provide one-click
physician access to that speciﬁc information, as explained in
Section 3.3. Regarding medical relevance, we stress that the REM
apps provide unprecedented support for personalizing patient
safety in radiology (cf. Section 4.1, which stresses the importance
of REM in the context of cancer prevention).
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrated the potential of MyPHRMa-
chines in terms of its openness. The MyPHRMachines platform
satisﬁes requirements that had been identiﬁed previously by
Mandl et al. and that existing platforms do not currently imple-
ment. In particular, PHR platforms suffer from weaknesses related
to the types of data supported as well as to the way in which they
handle data privacy.
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MyPHRMachines leverages VMs as ﬂexible and secure execu-
tion sandboxes. We have demonstrated the ﬂexibility of the
platform by showing that external developers could deploy apps
that deal with data that cannot be handled by the repositories of
other PHR platforms. The privacy strength follows from the plat-
form design. The VM sandboxes reside in a private cloud and apps
are not allowed to push data outside their sandbox. In our future
work, we will evaluate MyPHRMachines in controlled clinical
settings. We will also reﬁne our example apps and new demon-
strators will be designed and implemented, using data from
various types of devices. Finally, we will investigate which orga-
nization has sufﬁcient user level trust to host the MyPHRMachines
platform.
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